LODEX : sémantisation & visualisation

Site exemple

Title

Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate Change

Publication Year

2015

Author(s)
  • Gollier, Christian
  • Tirole, Jean
Source
ECONOMICS OF ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Pages: 5-27 Published: 2015
ISSN
2160-5882 eISSN: 2160-5890
Abstract

In environmental matters, the free riding generated by the lack of collective action is aggravated by concerns about leakages and by the desire to receive compensation in future negotiations. The dominant 'pledge and review approach to mitigation will deliver appealing promises and renewed victory statements, only to prolong the waiting game. The climate change global commons problem will be solved only through coherent carbon pricing. We discuss the roadmap for the negotiation process. Negotiators must return to the fundamentals: the need for uniform carbon pricing across countries, for verification, and for a governance process to which countries would commit. Each country would enjoy subsidiarity in its allocation of efforts within the country We suggest an enforcement scheme based on financial and trade penalties to induce all countries to participate and comply with the agreement. Finally, the choice among economic approaches, whether a carbon price commitment or a cap-and-trade, is subject to trade-offs, on which alternative reasonable views may co-exist. We discuss monitoring reasons for why we personally favor an international cap-and-trade agreement.

Author Keyword(s)
  • Pledge-and-review
  • carbon price
  • cap-and-trade
  • climate change
  • global warming
  • COP
  • international public goods
  • UN climate negotiations
  • prices versus quantities
KeyWord(s) Plus
  • POLLUTION PERMITS
  • MARKET
ESI Discipline(s)
  • Economics & Business
  • Environment/Ecology
  • Social Sciences
Web of Science Category(ies)
  • Economics
  • Environmental Studies
Adress(es)

[Gollier, Christian; Tirole, Jean] Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France

Reprint Adress

Gollier, C (reprint author), Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France.

Country(ies)
  • France
CNRS - Adress(es)
    Accession Number
    WOS:000360182900002
    uid:/C03ZVX5T
    Powered by Lodex 8.18.5